Edition 1.3 will come AFTER the totally new second version is out.

Why now? (p. 3) Increasing velocity of water use (people) and supply (climate) requires better matching; drought in England? Nature suffers first (because unmeasured). Most water problems can be traced to x-subsidies, i.e., misalignment of costs and benefits (intentional -- political -- or not; cf Part 2). Hydraulic mining/Something for nothing has to end. Scatter notes from RRD throughout book (Lifestyle since Industrial Revolution based on mining fossil fuels and fossil water). Per Mike Young: Stop playing politics with water (populism leads to shortages and special interests can capture rents). Design policies to treat water like a commodity, not a gift to an interest group (per Part 1 of TEoA). If you want to lower barriers to implementation, then find the winners and losers and negotiate from there. Note that new policies change the mix of winners/losers. For policy analysis, one can spend time analyzing the laws, players and their interactions in an attempt to understand its implications (a "structural form" model of cause and effect), or one can trace money flows (a "reduced form" model). The latter is easier to do and drives at the political heart of most policies: a redistribution of costs and benefits among interest groups. We need to make the opportunity cost of a bad policy relevant and clear.
Local (p. 6) M Young: If you want to encourage a community to innovate locally, from the ground up, then have them design a scheme to hit a quantifiable target and pay a reward for that WHEN it works, not before...
Diversion vs consumption (p. 10 and p 106) Tricky!, this and this
Change is hard (p. 21) monopolgy power plus psychology hinders water reform. (via EPI water): Hard to assess impacts without counterfactual (regs FORCE change but at what cost? Prices may invoke smae change at lower cost due to flexibility).
IBRs vs URs (p. 37+) IBRs, PSP fail, and decoupling (not!) and water budgets suck. Plus my paper (shows water is affordable most places and D slopes down). IBRs don't help efficiency or equity.
Prices, consumption and scarcity (p. 40) Global water tariff survey
Full cost pricing (p. 43) Anything less requires subsidies from the center, intl aid or reduced maintenance. PIIGS have cheapest water AND bad macro finances -- unsustainable. Political intervention into water harms the poor (and the Irish!). Good for the poor if it pays for staff who will protect facilities; poor more aware of NGOs than local govt!
CBA for meters (p. 46) and NRW (add to index!) Meters may not be cost effective: this and this and may not work out of elastic range. NRW one and two, but Sasha thinks costs of repairs may exceed benefits from lower water production costs. Dangereous rainwater tanks (subsidies!)
More on psychology (p. 47) This, this, this, this, this, this and this. Sanitation is hard (not just money but tradition/stress) in LDCs
Self-regulation on pollution (p. 57, 125) Fracking op/ed and watch outcomes, not outputs
Real time water quality monitoring (p. 57) via This post. Intake below outflow (or just monitored that way)? OECD report
Urban water recycling, property rights & markets (p. 58 and 107) via Chris Perry, plus brand wastewater as "used"
Three potential sources of household water (p. 60) via Future of Water and decentralized treatment
Sell you cheap water and pay you to not use it (p. 67) Via Emily, but also use Vegas 0.25 & 400 lcd with A'dam 1.25 EUR/m3 and 80 lcd. Prices vs. regs = do what the fuck you want.
Private water companies (p. 87) French companies without competition, don't let UK companies self-regulate! (and see paper), this (also see p 152 below) and this, and UK government fined water companies for missing targets -- and gave money to competitors (someone told me). Breaking monopolies
Cochabamba (p. 93) Cite this paper
Overpumping gw (p. 102) Not stopped by NL Green tax and contributes to sealevel rise.
Footprinting fail (p. 105) It's a measure but useless without scarcity context (this and Allan). Higher prices that reflect water scarcity are better than labeling, end of trade or regulations.
Farmers want to avoid transparent markets (p. 108+) CAP auction fail. So do corrupt pols (land/water grabs), but prices create property rights! A comparison of working markets and farmers may be outbid. All in auctions in Solutions. Conservation subsidies and more irrigation. This chat: Farmers target yield, moving from land-limted to water-limited ag, farmers' local knowledge (adapation plus useless regs).
Middle eastern farmers (p. 113) Using way too much water on ag. SA wheat program to end in 2016. (this post -- also subsidies to princes) and Future Water MENA report on file
Israel (p. 119) How they take water from Palestinians and this. Israel transfers Palestinian water to Israelis (via RRD). Fewer Saudi farmers switching from wheat to alfalfa (via RRD)
Fracking (p. 125) This post, this and op/ed cited above (p. 57). BL: useful and can afford to be clean.
The nexus of fail (p. 128) This post [NB: more govt in food and energy will lead to more hunger and cold]. Misleading energy labels (instead of prices)
Subjective value of water (p. 135) We all have them, nobody can know them, but markets/prices can reconcile them.
Regulators and pols may not oversee (p. 136) See this paper on weakened punishment and this on pols who prefer punishment to prices, and business incentives in a regulated environment. Complex regulations are harder to police, so don't issue more until you enforce the ones you have (and try to revoke those).
Collective action (p. 142) Scottsdale fail (and UCB climate fail) means that it's not always easy. Crowdsourcing can work by lowering the costs of coordination, information display and protest). But (p.144) not everyone can cooperate like the Dutch.
Our social side (p. 143) via Company of Strangers (see p. 85 and 280 on cooperation and Friedman), Blue Revolution, and 1:06:53 at this podcast (small groups are different than big groups).
Decreasing returns to regulation (p. 145?) via This post; see this "national vision" post (and comments) for think national, act local regulatory standards/enviro quality.
P-A Regulators (p. 146) who interfere, e.g, Westlands, Huffman and contractors. Revolving doors: see this and this. Power and moral hypocrisy, bad regulations are hard (impossible?) to remove. Pols good at building but not running (LT incentives)
Insurance as competition (p. 152) This and this, this and this and this on benchmarking competition
Managers with the power to fail (p. 155) Pritchett and Woolcock want to avoid relying on the "perfection" of bureaucrats who may fail by accident or through selfishness. See Table 2 and p. 198 on local participation in projects. See this site for an example (per DuFlo) on small scale, local solutions. NRW or just pump more as a "solution." Managers who sue each other with public money? Pushing on a string (get updated link)
Infrastructure (p. 157) The opportunity cost of wasteful government spending and Time to bust Aswan?, and the shift from IRS to DRS, and the Dam Zombie. RRD: A move from hard infrastructure to natural or low-tech, local infrastructure (India, Australia)
Zero value carbon (p. 192) See this post. CC and Rio fail
Insurance and floods (p. 194) See this post. NB: Adaptation: humans change faster than climate. Traditional flood defences need to be restored by nature. Flood damages will be big and this. Disaster math
Human rights and governance (p. 203) Dark irony of international rights, UN MDG fail: one, two and three. Database
Water wars! (p. 213) Weather fluctuations drive wars and Elixir (Tanzania farmers), but Aussie govt got serious about water management when supervision was transferred from dept water to dept finance in 1994 (via Blackmore (MDBC etc). DepFin wanted to maximize tax revenue, which required water be put to higher use. In US, IRS does not allow water donations to be deducted against income b/c "not property;" appraisers give a fraction of market value to water attached to land! Enviro water buyers may not like higher prices but better than conflict in political process. Market price easier for agreement.
Transboundary water disputes are not about use, per se, but consumption. Given that M&I consumption (fresh water withdrawals less wastewater discharges) is quite low, this means that the biggest contributor to transboundary disputes is agricultural use, which has a higher rate of consumption. (Water quality matters, of course, but it's easier to clean dirty water than make water from nothing.) This fact (if you will) means that most "water wars" are actually about agricultural water use and -- by extension -- the value of agricultural production and land. Farmers want to maximize those values (a flow and stock, respectively), and they often persuade their political friends to protect their economic interests -- even at a political (military, social, human) cost. Small-scale farmers and fishermen who cannot make a living when water is directed to more powerful groups can turn to violence.
To dos (p. 221) How to start a movement
Reading (p. 223) Read Blue Revolution, Rivers run dry and TANSTAAFL!
Glossary: (p. 229) An aquifer is not a 'pool' of water. It is not even the body of water contained within the pore-spaces. An aquifer is a body of rock that is water-bearing or capable of bearing water. It may be naturally recharged by surface water as stated but it can also be artificially recharged by injection wells, flooding basins, infiltration galleries etc. The use of the word 'pool' is particularly misleading as it encourages the imagining of a cavern occupied by something you might swim in. via Jonathan Abra